

May 26, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE PRESIDENT

Here at last is State's scenario for handling Israeli demands. Though I've provided them summarily, and delay is partly sheer laziness, I'll plead: (a) they've found it hard to adjust to the prospect of a commitment we've avoided for fifteen years; (b) this problem is incredibly sensitive; and (c) the situation in the area is much salient (though Israeli pressure is at low).

The scenario (Tab A) accepts that we must give greater security assurances to Israel but proposes linking them to a full nuclear and missile standstill agreement to be broached via a special emissary to both Israel and the USSR (Tab B). SO's insistence we inspect USSR as well as Israeli nuclear facilities gives us an opening here. I for one am convinced that Israel will go ahead with nuclear weapons unless we give her a security guarantee.

State proposes in effect entering into a quiet negotiation with the Israelis, conditioned upon their agreement to (a) call off their pressure campaign; (b) preserve secrecy; (c) agree not to move to West Bank while we're talking; and (d) cooperate in nuclear inspection. This is a tall order, but a good opening bid.

The negotiations are envisaged as lasting several months, and ending up either in a USSR-Israel arms limitation agreement plus security guarantees, or in a nuclear limitation/security arrangement with Israel alone.

The form of guarantee envisaged (Tab C) is an executive agreement or Presidential letter rather than a treaty, essentially to avoid Congressional problems. It of course falls far short of demands in SO's latest letter, especially SO's clear idea that alliance means USSR arms aid.

Tab D is the proposed interim letter to Husser calling him down. I think it falls far short of what's needed and will try a redo.

This whole problem area is so fraught with risk that we ought to make haste as slowly as we can. If we can get the Israelis to lay off public agitation in return for opening a private dialogue this should buy us time to feel out what they'll accept and what we can get in return. Given the HAWK/Refugee episode of last year, we want to avoid giving if possible before we've taped down the gold pro quo.


  
R. W. Komer

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TO : The Secretary  
FROM : DIA - Phillips Talbot (P)  
SUBJECT : Arms Limitations in the Near East

The President's Memorandum No. 223 of March 26, 1963, instructed the Department to develop proposals for revitalizing the development of advanced weapons in the Navy Fleet. The R&M was issued at the time a small working group was being formed under the direction of R&D and including CIA and AIAA participation to formulate an arms limitation arrangement and recommend a practical course of action. An outline summary of these recommendations is extracted.

The proposed talks hope to repeat the lessons learned from a previous secret peace with Russia and the GDR (the 1956 Ankara Rapsody) as well as more recent studies in NSA and S/P of the pros and cons of undertaking a serious exploration with the GDR and Latvia of a practical arrangement to prevent further escalation of unconventional weapons in the Baltic Sea.

Our Plan of Action envisages a highly secret probe of SAR and  
Bennell willingness to cooperate with us to increase their security (Q).  
We believe both sides have important reasons to do so (L1). If we are  
successful, we have much to gain (Q1). If the attempt fails, we believe  
it will do little harm. If it can be kept secret, and could have useful  
side effects (L2).

In mapping the choices for success, we recognize that the proposed U.S. probe has only a remote chance of success but we believe it would be highly opportune since: 1) Israel has refused the deposit to obtain a security guarantee; 2) the pressure of German exports to the EEC has led to a public face; 3) both the EEC and Israel have recently indicated their interest in a U.S. initiative (in both of EEC and some of the White House); 4) [REDACTED] estimating that Israel, unless deterred by outside pressure, will attempt to produce a nuclear weapon sometime in the next several years and could dominate a domestically developed nuclear device race in 1985 or 1986; 5) while the EEC has a most publicized missile program, Israel will shortly overtake the slight U.S. lead; and 6) these trends are highly dangerous and, if allowed to continue unchanged, present U.S. capability to act.

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1994-1995  
1995-1996

**GROUP 1**  
Enriched from environmental  
downgrading and  
degradation

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SUBJECT: Near East Arms Limitation and  
Control Arrangement - Plan of Action

II. Recommendations:

That the U.S. seek an administrative, reasonably simple, arrangement in the Near East designed to prevent Israel and the D.A.R. from acquiring, (i) a station, (ii) nuclear weapons and (iii) nuclear-to-warhead strategic missiles. Given the tremendous stakes involved, there should be an immediate confidential probe of Israeli and D.A.R. willingness to cooperate toward this end.

Careful study has been given to this problem in recent months. There is reason to believe that such an effort would have some prospect of success and should be tied to Israel's efforts to obtain a security guarantee. Properly handled and if necessary if the negotiations can be preserved, the effort, even if unsuccessful, would not harm U.S. interests in the case and useful side benefits would be derived from the attempt.

III. The Advanced Weapons Problem:

A. The Israeli, unless deterred by outside pressure, [REDACTED]

B. The D.A.R.'s compulsion to counter such a development is likely to bring it into increasing dependence on the Soviet Union for its security.

C. Both Israel and the D.A.R. are also devoting increasing efforts to the development of strategic missiles.

III. The Approach Plan:

A. It is easier to establish controls over weapons which are not yet in the possession of either side.

B. The danger of pre-emptive attack increases as both sides learn of each other's advances in sophisticated weapons development. Both have expressed to the United States their great concern with the weapons development of the other.

C. As programs

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C. As progress for developing sophisticated weapons continues, the ability of the U.S. to control any hostilities which might occur between Israel and the PLO will decrease.

D. Repeated public and private expressions of concern by U.S. officials of the dangers of arms escalation and nuclear proliferation to the arms dispute will only exacerbate the problem.

E. The rise in U.S. domestic pressure against arms escalation in the Near East, particularly against the PLO missile efforts make such an approach increasingly urgent.

F. If the U.S. is to move ahead on a security assurance for Israel, the commitment Israel makes to us must be made conditional on an Israeli commitment to not to develop nuclear weapons or offensive missiles; such a commitment may be impossible to secure in the absence of a parallel assurance from the U.S.

**IV. Mr. Barak and the Carter Regime: Regional Responsibility**

Although the proposed U.S. probe will encounter serious obstacles, the following factors have considerable weight in support of a favorable response:

**A. Barak**

1. Has a great deal to gain since Israel has both a technological and a far greater capacity in the nuclear field and will soon overtake the PLO in missile development, whereas the PLO's ultimate advantages lie in conventional threats;

**B. Barak**

2. Will seek to obtain U.S. estimates of Israeli capabilities and monitoring of French developments since he sees Israeli capabilities in these areas;

3. Will wish to be cooperative to the U.S. since he will perceive advantages in encouraging the flow of U.S. aid and avoiding undue military and economic dependence on the Communist bloc;

4. Will perceive some future tactical advantage in building this position in the Arab-Israeli bloc as a united statement opposed to nuclear testing and nuclear proliferation; and

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4. In under considerable and growing strain to allocate his small economic resources to development in order to cope with his rapidly increasing population and to meet its rising expectations.

B. Int. Options

They will be harder to convince than Baader since Israel will be rely primarily on its own military capabilities. However, Ben Gurion might be persuaded to give up a militarily, tremendous increase in Israel's capability for the following reasons:

1. Will be more receptive to firm U.S. pressure since he is aware that Israel is, ultimately, dependent upon the U.S. for security and as seeks to increase U.S. involvement;
2. Recognizes the extent of U.S. opposition to nuclear proliferation and will seek to maximize his strengths within this context if he cannot otherwise do;
3. Right recognizes that while early development of nuclear weapons offers Israel some major defensive advantages, it could be quickly self-defeating by forcing U.S. to turn to the Soviets as Castro-like teams, and by providing the Soviets, or even中国人, with a golden opportunity for providing a nuclear guarantee for the Arab Free State;
4. Due to Israel's proclaimed peaceful aims and desire to build a national home, willing to divert funds to developmental projects if this can be done in security; and
5. Will perceive no danger to Israel since, if successful, Israel's security will be enhanced; he may think that, if unsuccessful, what Israel regards as U.S. flirtation with Baader will likely be ended.

If the U.S. is prepared to provide a security guarantee conditional upon Israeli agreement to an arms limitation arrangement, this should also be a powerful incentive.

V. Concept of the Initial Approach

4. Designation of a secret Presidential emissary who, because of his reputation of identifications with the President, will be attractive to both sides. He should arrive in Cairo for a three-day visit early in June, thence proceeding to a third country and returning via Israel.

B. The emissary

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4. The emissary during the initial approach would seek to impress on Nasser and Ben Gurion the serious concern of the U.S. Government over the Arab East Arab case and the inherent risks of U.S. neutrality in nuclear conflicts.

(1) Purpose would be to probe the motivations and ways to establish a simple and substantive arrangement which would (a) assure both the U.S. and Israel that unconventional armaments are being curbed and (b) would not entail interferences with forces necessary for national security or progress nor prevent controls in the fields of atomic energy and outer space.

(2) Primary emphasis would be on nuclear weapons and offensive missile systems but the emissary would also be prepared to discuss other areas such as bacteriological and chemical warfare which do not consider a major threat. Bacteriological warfare is not a realistic threat.

5. The approach would be flexible:

(1) No formal agreement expected between the U.S. and Israel; however, U.S. bilateral arrangements with each party would be expected as a minimum.

(2) Would suggest that the key for controlled armaments is a quiet competent third party (i.e., the U.S.) for both the negotiating and implementing phases.

(3) Would be prepared to indicate that the U.S. stands ready to take appropriate action, either by Presidential letter incorporating a unilateral statement of policy without limiting legal force or an executive agreement to support the independence and integrity of each country. It would specify that in the event of aggression or threat of aggression, the two governments would immediately determine, in accordance with the constitutional processes, what action might be appropriately taken. This agreement would terminate automatically if the bilateral arrangement for arms limitation were abrogated or violated.

(4) Would support development of independent detection capabilities of Israel and the U.S. (in order to double check).

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information given by a third party) as well as use of IAEA or other compatible arrangements -- the more effective these are, the lesser the U.S. role has to be.

C. Would be prepared to discuss possible U.S. participation in atomic energy or space programs of both sides as one form of verification (and to provide incentive for their cooperation).

D. Fourth countries would not be informed of the initial approach.

#### VI. What We Would Eventually Hope to Accomplish

1. While the adversary would describe different alternative schemes for arms limitation -- both public and private, unilateral and multilateral -- we would ultimately hope to wind up with the following largely secret arrangements:

(1) An understanding by both sides not to develop, test, manufacture, or import nuclear weapons or surface-to-surface missiles which would be "strategic" in terms of the Bear Kazakhstan.

(2) Peaceful nuclear programs and scientific space research programs would be declared and subject to safeguards, with the nuclear program preferably subject to IAEA safeguards.

(3) A cooperative arrangement for prompt access for U.S. technicians to any potential production facility for weapons or missiles considered suspicious by the U.S. or the other country; refusal to allow access would be considered prima facie evidence of violation.

4. The non-importation requirement would preclude stationing on the territory of the two countries foreign teams equipped with such arms. The non-development and testing requirement would also preclude either side from conducting this activity within a third country.

5. The inspection system devised to accomplish this purpose would not be elaborate or formalized. A few technical personnel would be assigned to our liaison. Visits by technical personnel would be supplemented by normal U.S. intelligence-gathering capabilities.

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6. The DIA's present activities are largely also peace which is right reason for that purpose. Present DIA missile development would be re-directed toward prestigious outer space programs.

### VII. After the Initial Approach

- A. If both sides wish further exploratory talks, a small staff would be sent to the field to lay groundwork for the second visit.
  - B. A fourth country would be brought into the picture if the nature of the response justified it.
  - C. While negotiations must remain absolutely secret, certain aspects of this approach may become public if an arrangement is developed. We would seek to keep the specific secret and would pursue with **SECRET** possible steps to protect this position with Arab public opinion if the arrangement should surface.

### VIII. Fourth Country

- A. **France**: The absence of hard information on the close French-Israeli technical relationship in the nuclear and missile field remains a major handicap. While it is desired that the French would provide Israel with a nuclear delivery, possible covert arrangements with the French in the nuclear and missile field outside Israel is a potential problem. **SECRET** will probably realize he is better off if the U.S. gives him assurances that it will seek to stop any existing covert arrangement than if it does nothing; also, the ambiguous position outlined above should identify Israeli activities well before **SECRET** has an operational capacity from the nucill.

- B. **Soviet Union**: The Soviets are unlikely to supply the IAI with a nuclear weapon and have avoided thus far applying large missiles. Attempts by the Soviet Union to disrupt any arms limitation arrangement would have to be accepted as a calculated risk if it becomes public. However, Soviet opportunists would be disseminated considerably if the U.S. does not feel compelled to turn to the U.S.S.R. to gain parity with Israel in the nuclear and missile field.

### X. Little Benefits from U.S. Approach Failure

- A. Even if we do not succeed, we will have a better idea of conditions and likely sticking points by both sides for an arms control arrangement. If we should undertake another initiative in the future, we will have an important point of reference.

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- B. **Illuminating effects.** Both Ben-Gurion and Benyamin will have a better appreciation of the problems, economic costs, and risks involved if they try to develop unconventional weapons.
- C. We will have greater freedom of action in the Near East to pursue unilateral means to stop nuclear proliferation.

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